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PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS
AND PLEA BARGAINING:
WHAT ARE THE LIMITS?-
BORDENKIRCHER v. HAYES
It is undisputed that the practice of' negotiating pleas is crucial to
the continued existence of the criminal justice system. 1 Historically
and statistically, it is evident that the entire criminal justice system is
premised on the assumption that 90 percent of all cases will never go
to trial. 2 Yet, until recently, plea bargaining was conducted sub
silentio amidst forthright assertions that the practice itself was uncon-
stitutional. 3 It was not until 19714 that the Supreme Court
sanctioned plea bargaining as a necessary and indeed advantageous
1. "The widely held opinion that prosecutors never bargain is a myth. As a practical matter
they must in order to stay in business." Polstein, How to "Settle" a Criminal Case, 8 PRAC.
LAW. 35, 37 (1962). See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257- (1971), where the Supreme
Court stated that plea bargaining "is an essential component of the administration of jus-
tice. . . . If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal
Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities."
Id. at 260. See also M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1972) in which the author states that
"the great majority (ranging in some jurisdictions to around 90 percent) of those formally
charged with crimes plead guilty." Id. at vii; Bechefsky, Another Slant - Plea Bargaining: An
Essential Component of Criminal Justice, 52 CAL. S. B. J. 214 (1977).
2. Mr. Chief Justice Burger expressed this practical consideration in his address to the
American Bar Association in 1970 when he stated: "It is an elementary fact, historically and
statistically, that the system of courts-the number of judges, prosecutors, and of court-
rooms-has been based on the premise that approximately 90 percent of all defendants will
plead guilty, leaving only 10 percent, more or less, to be tried." N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1970, at
24, col. 4.
3. See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HAsV. L. REV. 1387 (1970).
This article offers an excellent overall analysis of plea bargaining and the constitutional implica-
tions inherent in this process. For a general background of the prosecutorial aspect of the
system, see Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Ci. L. REV. 50 (1968);
Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA.
L. REV. 865 (1964). For a description of the attitudes of certain state's attorneys, judges and
defense lawyers on plea bargains and an analysis of the statutory law in Illinois, see Comment,
Guilty Pleas in Illinois-The Enigma of Substantial Compliance, 24 DE PAUL L. REV. 42
(1974).
4. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). The defendant, Santobello, was originally
indicted on two felony counts involving illegal gambling. The prosecutor agreed to make no
sentence recommendation if the defendant would plead guilty to the lesser included offense of
possession of gambling records. Upon sentencing, a new prosecutor, apparently unaware of the
"deal", recommended the maximum sentence. The Supreme Court openly acknowledged that
plea bargaining was a necessary component of the criminal justice system, but stated that due
process required that the state live up to its part of any bargain struck. While accepting the
constitutionality of plea bargains, the Supreme Court admonished that "all of these considera-
tions presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an accused and a prosecutor." Id. at
261.
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process. 5 However, this approval did not preclude the imposition of
requirements to assure that any plea entered by the defendant was
within the mandates of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 6  Most recently, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,7 the Su-
preme Court limited this constitutional protection by holding that the
due process requirement prohibiting governmental vindictiveness 8 is
not applicable to post-plea bargaining reindictments when a defen-
dant insists on his constitutional right to plead not guilty.
This Note will examine the Supreme Court's decision and dem-
onstrate that it is grounded on faullty legal anal\ sis and that it tiled
to come to grips with the real legal issue presented by the facts. It
will further show that the Court's incorrect analysis resulted in the
sanctioning of blatant prosecutorial vindictiveness in an effort to pre-
serve the constitutionality of plea bargaining. Finally, the Note will
suggest an alternative approach to reconciling the need for
prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining and the protection of a de-
fendant's due process rights.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Paul Lewis Hayes was indicted in Fayette County, Kentucky, for
passing a forged instrument in the amount of $88.30.9 After the de-
fendant had retained cotinsel, the prosecutor oflered to recommend
a five year prison sentence if Hayes would plead guilty to the forgery
charge. 10 The defendant, insisting on his innocence and his right to
5. While discussing the advantages of plea bargaining and the constitutionality of the prac-
tice, the Court stated that plea bargains increased the prompt disposition of cases, decreased
the amount of time an accused who could not post bond would be in jail awaiting trial, and
possibly increased the likelihood of rehabilitation of the accused. 1d. at 261.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (re-
quirement that the prosecutor keep his part of the bargain); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742 (1970) (right to counsel during plea negotiations); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)
(requiring that the trial record indicate that the guilty plea was entered Voluntarily and know-
ingly).
7. 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978).
8. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), where the Court required that
a sentencing judge aflirmatively establish any increase in sentence given to a defendant who had
successfully appealed and set aside his original conviction. The Court stated that:
due process . . . requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having success-
fully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after
a new trial . . . due'process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension
of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.
Id. at 725. '
9. 98 S. Ct. at 665. The offense was punishable by a term ranging from two to ten years in
prison. See Ky. REV. STAT. § 434.130 (1970) (repealed 1974).
10. Justice Powell in his dissenting opinion states: I observe, at this point, that five years in
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trial, refused the offer. The prosecutor warned that if Hayes did not
accept the bargain,' 1 the state would reindict him under Kentucky's
Habitual Criminal Statute,' 2 which carried a harsher sentence for an
prison for the offense charged hardly could be characterized as a generous offer." 98 S. Ct. at
671 (Powell, J., dissenting).
11. There is no doubt from the record that the statement of the prosecutor to the defendant
was a threat. During cross examination of the defendant the prosecutor admitted the intimida-
tion by stating:
Isn't it a fact that I told you at that time [the initial bargaining session] that if you
did not intend to plead guilty to five years for this charge and . . . save the court
the inconvenience and necessity of a trial and taking up this time that I intended to
return to the grand jury and ask them to indict you based upon these prior felony
convictions?
Id. at 665 .l.
12. At the time of Hayes' conviction the statute read as follows:
Conviction of felon*r; punishment on second and third offenses. Any person con-
victed a second time of a felony shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than
double the time of the sentence under the first conviction; if convicted a third time
of a felon), he shall be confined in the penitentiary during his life. Judgment in
such cases shall not be given for the increased penalty unless the jury finds, from
the record and other competent evidence, the fact of former convictions for felony
committed by the prisoner in or out of this state.
Ky. REs'. STA'r. § 431.190 (1970) (repealed 1975). Haves' first conviction resulted from a charge of
rape brought when he was 17 years old. He pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of
"detaining a female." He was sent to a reformatory for five years. His second offense was
robbery for which he was sentenced to five years in prison, but received probation. 98 S. Ct. at
671 (Powell, J., dissenting). Thus, his conviction on the forgery charge was a conviction of a
third felony under the statute. It seems ironic that the statute has since been repealed and
Hayes would not qualify as an habitual criminal under the new statute. The present statute
describes two classes of persistent felony offenders. A felony offender in the second degree must
be more than 21 years old and have been convicted of one previous felony. A felony offender in
the first degree (which is the special category of Hayes) must be more than 21 years and be
convicted of a felony after conviction of two prior felonies. The statute defines a previous felony
as:
a conviction of a felony in this state or conviction of a crime in any other jurisdiction
provided:
(a) That a sentence to a term of imprisonment of one (1) year or more or a sen-
tence to death was imposed therefore; and
(b) That the offender was over the age of eighteen (18) years at the time the
offense was committed; and
(c) That the offender:
1. Completed service of the sentence imposed on any of the previous
felony convictions within five (5) years prior to the date of the commission of
the felony for which he now stands convicted; or
2. Was on probation or parole from any of the previous felony convictions
at the time of the commission of the felony for which he now stands con-
victed; or
3. Was discharged from probation or parole on any of the previous felony
convictions within five (5) years prior to the date of commission of the felony
for which he now stands convicted.
KY. REV. STAT. § 532.080 (1977 Interim Supp.). Hence the conviction for detaining a female
would not apply as a previous felony under the new statute since Hayes was under 18 when he
committed the offense and a term of imprisonment was not imposed for that conviction.
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accused with a record of two prior felony convictions.13  Hayes' re-
fusal to accept the plea offer led the prosecutor to follow through with
his threat and obtain a second indictment for the enhanced charge.
4
The defendant was tried and convicted on the initial forgery charge
and, in a separate proceeding, was adjudged an "habitual criminal"
and given the mandatory life sentence. 15 After a futile attempt at
state appellate review, 16 Hayes filed a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky,
which was rejected. 17  The United States Court of Appeals 18 re-
versed Hayes' conviction, stating that once a discretionary decision
has been made to indict an accused for a lesser charge than the facts
may warrant, a subsequent indictment under a more severe charge
for the same offense is an unconstitutional burden on the defendant's
right to plead not guilty. 19
13. There is no question that the Habitual Criminal Statute in Kentucky was constitutional.
See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Gryger v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912); McDonald v. Mas-
sachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895). These cases involved
similar statutes which were upheld against various constitutional attacks including due process,
ex post facto laws, cruel and unusual punishment, equal protection, privileges and immunities,
and various procedural attacks.
14. The use of a recidivist or habitual offender statute as a tool for inducing a defendant to
plead guilty is not unusual in the criminal justice system. See J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND
GUILTY PLEAS § 5.08 (1975); D. NENVMAN, CONVICTION: THE I)ETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 57-58 (1966) (although the author indicates that an indictment
under these types of statutes is rare). For a discussion of the use of habitual offender statutes as
a "'lever" in plea negotiations, see J. KLEIN, LET'S MAKE A DEAL 101-11 (1976), where the
author describes the statutes as significant factors in persuading a reluctant defendant to plead
guilty. The social policy underlying utilization of the statutes is the welfare of the community
and not the rehabilitation of the accused. For a discussion of how this "preventive detention"
philosophy nay effect the constitutional rights of' all the community, see Tribe, All Ounce of
Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371 (1970). See also
Brown, West Virginia Habitual Criminal Law, 59 W. VA. L. REV. 30 (1956); Note, Court
Treatment of General Recidivist Statutes, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 238 (1948).
15. 98 S. Ct. at 666. This rather harsh penalty for the forgery of a check of less than a
hundred dollars is surprising but not unique. In People ex rel. Marcley v. Lowes, 24 N.Y. 249,
172 N.E. 487 (1930) the defendant was convicted under an habitual criminal statute, because he
had "previously stolen chickens, certain automobile parts and a motorcycle." Id. at 488. That
court reversed his conviction, stating that, since the sentence was suspended on one of the prior
convictions, it (lid not qualify as a "conviction" tinder the state's habitual criminal statute.
16. The opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals was not published. 98 S. Ct. at 666.
17. The opinion of the District Court was not reported. 98 S. Ct. at 666 n.4.
18. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42 (6th Cir. 1976).
19. Id. at 44. The court stated that "although a prosecutor may in the course of plea negoti-
ations offer a defenclant concessions relating to prosecution under an existing indictment . . . he
may not threaten a defendant with the consequence that more severe charges may be brought if
he insists on going to trial." Id.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 20 and, in a
5-4 decision, 21 reversed the holding of the court of appeals. In
concluding that the prosecutor's action was permissible, the
Court considered cases which turned on two distinct constitutional
principals: the acceptability of plea bargaining; and the prohibition of
governmental vindictiveness. 22  The Supreme Court upheld the pro-
secutor's action despite evidence of vindictiveness and defended its
holding on the ground that a rigid constitutional standard affecting
the prosecutor's discretionary decisions would adversely affect the en-
tire plea bargaining process. 23
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A complete understanding of the Court's rationale in Hayes neces-
sitates a review of the case law regarding plea bargaining and gov-
ernmental vindictiveness. The Court has long recognized that a guilty
plea has a significant effect on a defendant since it involves relin-
quishment of various constitutional rights, including the right to trial
by a jury,24 the right to confront one's accusers, 25 and the right
against self-incrimination. 26 In reality, it is a conviction in that it is a
20. 97 S. Ct. 2672 (1977).
21. Four justices dissented. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
argued that the Court was deviating substantially from the sound rules laid down in cases re-
garding retaliatory state action. 98 S. Ct. at 669 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
would have affirmed the lower court and applied this due process standard to plea bargaining.
Id. Justice Powell, filing a separate dissent, noted that although he would agree with the major-
ity in theory, the facts in this case required reliance on the vindictiveness cases and not on the
acceptability of plea bargaining. 98 S. Ct. at 671 (Powell, J., dissenting).
22. Reviewing the cases decided on the issue of vindictiveness, the Court found that the
instant case did not involve this issue.'It held that the Hayes case did not turn on due process
limitations of state retaliation against a defendant who asserts a constitutional right. The Court
said that the due process consideration against vindictiveness was not applicable to the plea
bargaining process because of the prosecutor's need for virtually unbridled discretion, stating
that "a rigid constitutional rule that would prohibit a prosecutor from acting forthrightly in his
dealings with the defense could only invite unhealthy subterfuge that would drive the practice
of plea bargaining back into the shadows from which it has so recently emerged." 98 S. Ct. at
669.
23. Having recognized the practical necessity of plea bargaining, it is clear that the Court
would hesitate to question the constitutionality of this process. But see Note, The Supreme
Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 30, 148-56 (1970) for a discussion of the Court's analysis
of two cases, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) and Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 791 (1970), in light of the Court's ruling in Jackson v. United States, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
Jackson led practitioners to believe that plea bargaining may be held unconstitutional since it
places unnecessary burdens on a defendant's choice to assert his constitutional rights. The Su-
preme Court held the guilty pleas rendered in both Brady and Parker constitutional since they
had been entered knowingly and voluntarily. The Note suggests that the Court's analysis fails to
deal adequately with prior decisions that limited the imposition of difficult choices when a
defendant attempts to assert his constitutional rights.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
25. Id.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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final determination of the charges against the defendant. 27 The se-
verity of the deprivation of rights concomitant with an admission of
guilt has induced courts to require that a plea be entered voluntar-
ily 28 and knowingly, 29 and that negotiations be conducted in the
presence of counsel"30
Plea bargaining itself was finally given recognition as a constitution-
ally permissible practice in Santobello v. New York, 31 in which the
Supreme Court required that any offer made by the state to induce a
defendant to plead guilty be adhered to by the prosecutor. The ac-
ceptance of plea bargaining as a practical necessity is evidenced by
the Court's recent statement that "whatever may be the situation in
an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomi-
tant plea bargain are important components of this country's criminal
justice system." 32 The Hayes decision also involved the concept of
state retaliation or vindictiveness. The vindictiveness cases are prem-
ised on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 33  Due process has been defined to encompass a pro-
hibition of vindictiveness or retaliatory state action against a-defend-
ant for asserting constitutional rights. The Court has held that due
process of law forbids vindictiveness to play any part in a judge's
27. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). In Boykin, the defendant was charged
with robbery and pleaded guilty to a five count indictment. Emphasizing the importance of a
guitly plea, the Court reversed the conviction since the record (lid not indicate that the defend-
ant voluntarily and understandingly waived his constitutional rights when he pleaded guilty to
the charges. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (applying the Sixth Amendment to the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding the Fifth
Amendment applicable to the states through the Due-Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment). See also Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927) where, speaking gener-
ally of guilty pleas, the Court stated that "a plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a
mere admission or an extra judicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it
is conclusive." Id. at 223.
28. In Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957), the court held that a guilty
plea would withstand a due process attack only if it was made voluntarily. The defendant in
Shelton apparently pleaded guilty to a charge of interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle in
return for the dismissal of other charges and a recommendation by the prosecutor of a sentence
of one year. Plea bargaining was not specifically acknowledged, but the court said that a positive
inducement to a defendant to plead guilty would not render that plea involuntary.
29. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) required that the record clearly indicate that a
plea of guilty was entered knowingly and understandingly.
30. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The defendant in Brady was convicted of
kidnapping and pleaded guilty after his codefendant pleaded guilty and he was told that the
codefendant would testify against him at trial. Although the Supreme Court did not reverse his
conviction on the ground that his plea was not voluntary, it required that the defense attorney
be present during any plea negotiations between the prosecutor and the defendant. Since the
defendant's attorney was present, Brady's plea was considered voluntary.
31. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). For a discussion of the litcts in this case, see note 4 supra.
32. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
33. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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determination of sentence for a defendant who was found guilty on
retrial after a successful post-conviction attack on his original convic-
tion. 34
This protective rule has been held to be fully applicable to the
prosecutor,35 since he surely would have a motive to discourage ap-
peals. 36  It has been extended by lower courts to prohibit prosecutor-
ial action in increasing charges after a mistrial, 37 after a request for a
change of venue, 38 and -after a refusal to waive a right to trial. 39  The
vindictiveness cases, therefore, ensure that a defendant need not fear
punishment for the assertion of a constitutional right.40
34. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1970). The defendant need not prove actual
retaliatory motivation since the "mere apprehension" of vindictiveness may unconstitutionally
deter a defendant's assertion of his rights. In Pearce, the Court stated that:
Due Process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for hav-
ing successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he
receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness maxy unconstitu-
tionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his
first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension
of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.
Id. at 725.
35. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). The defendant was originally charged with the
misdemeanor of assault with a deadly weapon, under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33 (b)(1) (1969),
following an altercation with another inmate in the North Carolina penitentiary. He was rein-
dicted on the felony charge of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflict bodily
injury under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32 (a) (1969), after he filed an appeal from his conviction on
the misdemeanor charge. The Court concluded that the Pearce rule was necessary to prevent
the appearance of vindictiveness. 417 U.S. at 28.
36. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
37. United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974), where the court admonished
the prosecutor for indicting a defendant for first degree murder after he had been granted a
mistrial on the charge of second degree murder.
38. United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1977). The defendant moved for a
change of venue, and the government subsequently indicted the defendant on a second count
based on substantially the same facts. In discussing its rationale for dismissing the second count,
the court stated that "Blackledge [Perry] and Pearce each establish a prophylactic rule imposing
limits upon prosecutorial discretion . . . when such actions carry with them the opportunity of
retaliation for a defendant's exercise of a statutory right that has due process implication." Id. at
1227.
39. United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976). The defendant was
indicted on a misdemeanor charge. He pleaded not guilty and refused to waive his right to be
tried by a district judge and his right to a jury trial. The prosecutor then reindicted the defen-
dant on a felony charge. The court held that this prosecutorial action was in violation of the due
process of law requirements established pursuant to Pearce and Perry. The court did note,
however, that the holding did not bar any rcindictinent alter a defendant refused to waive a
jury trial, since new facts and a changed circumstance could negate the presumption of vindic-
tiveness that accompanied the reindictment. id. at 1370 n.4.
40. The Pearce rule applies only to situations in which an accused faces a realistic apprehen-
sion that state vindictiveness will be a decisive factor in the disposition of his case. A harsher
sentence at a trial de novo after conviction in a court of limited jurisdiction does not necessarily
indicate vindictiveness. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972) in which the Court, while
affirming Pearce, held that "the hazard of being penalized for seeking a new trial, which under-
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Prior to Hayes, plea bargaining and state vindictiveness were dealt with
as distinct constitutional issues. The constitutional permissibility of
plea bargaining was premised on the theory that a bargain benefits
both the state and the accused. 41  This rationale sanctioned a bargain-
ing scheme that was mutally beneficial to the accused and the state
and was the result of practical necessity. The defendant, Hayes, however,
characterized plea bargaining as a practice that penalized a defendant
who does not accept the state's bargains and insists on the full asser-
tion of his constitutional rights. 42 This characterization clearly
suggests that vindictiveness and plea bargaining could no longer re-
main separate issues. In Hayes, the Supreme Court was presented
with the choice of either synthesizing the two independent lines of
cases, or declaring one line controlling.
The factual frarework established by the Supreme Court effec-
tively predetermined which line of cases the Court would follow. This
can best be demonstrated by reviewing the substantive difference be-
tween the facts as accepted by the court of appeals and the factual
premise stated by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court saw no
difference between a subsequent indictment on a more serious charge
lay[s] the holding in Pearce" is not present in a system which allows a trial de novo as a matter
of right. Id. at 116. Similarly, in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), the Court upheld
the defendant's harsher sentence upon retrial following a successful post-conviction attack be-
cause the sentencing was done by a jury. The fears of retaliation in such a case were deemed
insignificant since a jury would have no motive to punish the defendant for asserting his con-
stitutional rights.
41. This analysis is in keeping with the theory that a state may not condition a benefit on
the relinquishment of a constitutional right. For an interesting survey on the various benefits
that the Congress and the states have attempted to condition on a waiver of a constitutional
right, see Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HAIRV. L. REV. t595 (1960). See also Danforth,
Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examination? Privilege Against Self-Incriinination, 19 RUT-
GERS L. REV. 489 (1965); Macgill, Selective Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative
Grace, 54 VA. L. REV. 1355 (1968). Conditioning a constitutional right, as opposed to a state
benefit, upon a waiver of a different right is equally repugnant to the Constitution. See Van
Alstyne, In Gideons Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE
L. J. 606 (1965); Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
144 (1968). Cf. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (declaring that self-incriminating
testimony induced by fear of loss of employment was inadmissible); Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that neither the trial judge nor the prosecutor may comment on a
defendant's failure to take the stand in his own defense); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
(holding that a defendant could nuot be held in contempt for asserting his right to remain silent).
Thus, the Court would be in a difficult position if the plea bargaining process was considered
punitive to those defendants who did not avail themselves of the benefits of a plea offer. Al-
though there would not be a "condition" on their assertion of their constitutional rights, there
would be a negative repercussion for their refusal to do so if their sentences were increased.
42. Brief for Respondent at 22, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978). The defen-
dant argues that he "refused to accept the prosecutor's plea bargain .. braved the hazards of
a trial on the more serious habitual offender charge, and received a sentence to life imprison-
ment." Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
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against a defendant who refuses to plead guilty and the situation
where the prosecutor begins plea negotiations with two indictments
and makes an offer to reduce the charges by dismissing one of
them. 43  However, the court of appeals did not question whether the
prosecutor had the authority to bring both charges initially, but focused on
whether the prosecutor could make a discretionary decision to bring an
additional indictment After plea negotiations had failed. 4"
It has been recognized that the prosecutor has broad discretion in
his decision to prosecute a case. 45  A prosecutor may bring as many
or as few charges against a defendant as he feels are warranted, as
long as the facts justify the charge. 46  Generally, the courts
give wide latitude to prosecutorial discretion and defer to the pro-
secutor's initial decision.4 7 This latitude is premised on the assump-
tion that the prosecutor's decision to charge or refrain from charging
is due to his good faith judgment regarding what is in the public
interest. 48 Standards defining the boundaries of prosecutorial discre-
43. The Supreme Court clearly sets out this factual framework at the beginning of its
analysis. The Court states: "[a]s a practical matter, in short, this case would be no different if
the grand jury had indicted Hayes as a recidivist from the outset, and the prosecutor had
offered to drop that charge as a part of the plea bargain." 98 S. Ct. at 666.
44. The court of appeals makes this clear initially. "Although a prosecutor may in the course
of plea negotiations offer a defendant concessions relating to prosecution under an existing in-
dictment ...he may not threaten a defendant with the consequences that more severe charges
may be brought if he insists on going to trial." 547 F.2d at 44.
45. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
46. Cf. United States v. Brown, 482 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1973), where the court upheld the
defendant's conviction for knowingly making false statements. The court stated that when an act
violates more than one statute, the government may elect to bring the charge under either.
47. Spillman v. United States, 413 F.2d 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 930 (1969).
The defendant was prosecuted for sending obscene materials through the mails in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1461 and conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371. He argued that there was a Department
of Justice memo regarding the nonenforcement of that statute. In upholding his conviction, the
court stated that they could not meddle into the affairs of the United States Attorney's Office
since wide latitude must be given to the prosecutor to properly effectuate the law.
48. The American Bar Association has proposed standards relating to the prosecutor's deci-
sion to charge a defendant. The standards are set out as follows:
§ 3.9 Discretion in the charging decision.
(a) In addressing himself to the decision whether to charge, the prosecutor
should first determine whether there is evidence which would support a conviction.
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might
support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent
with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that evidence exists
which would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor
may properly consider in exercising his discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular
offense or the offender;
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tion include the acceptability of charging a defendant with a lesser
charge than the facts would indicate if "the public interest is best
served and even-handed justice is best dispensed by this more flexi-
ble and individualized determination." 49
In Hayes, the prosecutor was aware of all the facts regarding the
crime when he chose to indict the defendant on the unenhanced
charge of forgery.5 0  It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the
prosecutor's initial assessment of the case led him to forego the
habitual offender charge. 51  This would indicate that the prosecutor's
failure to indict Hayes under the enhanced charge initially was prem-
ised on his belief that not securing that indictment was commensurate
with the ends of justice. There is more than a mere chronological
distinction between an initial two-count indictment and an original
one-count indictment with an additional subsequent indictment upon
failure of a plea bargain. Therefore, the Supreme Court's initial
categorization of the facts in this case was faulty. Because a
discretionary decision to refrain from prosecuting the habitual of-
fender charge had been made, the subsequent contradiction of that
decision raised the presumption that the motivation for the additional
charge was vindictive.
The court of appeals addressed the question of vindictiveness as
part of a continuum, observing that the prosecutor's action after the
bargaining session was unconstitutional. By holding that the pro-
secutor's action in Hayes was no different than the action taken by a
prosecutor who would initially have indicted the defendant under
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant;
(v) prolonged non-enforcement of a statute, with community acquiescence;
(vi) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(vii) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others;
(viii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction.
(c) In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight to
the personal or political advatages or disadvantages which might be involved or to
a desire to enhance his record of convictions.
(d) In cases which involve a serious threat to the comunnity, the prosecutor
should not be deterred from prosecution Iv the fact that in his jurisdiction juries
have tended to acquit persons accused of the particular kind of criminal act in ques-
tion.
(e) The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in number or degree
than he can reasonably support with evidence at trial.
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND TIlE DEFENSE FUNCTION
STANDARDS WITH COMMENTARY § 3.9, TiIE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (1971).
49. Id. Comment to subsection (b). See ABA STANDARDS, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.8 (a) (iii)
(Approved Draft 1968).
50. 98 S. Ct. at 671 (Powell, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
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both counts, the Supreme Court's factual framework limits the ques-
tion of vindictiveness to the boundaries of the plea bargaining table.
This perspective requires the Supreme Court to view the issue of
vindictiveness as that which inheres in the closed door sessions of
negotiation between the defendant and the state in criminal cases,
instead of the vindictiveness that is exhibited in post-plea bargaining
retaliation. Thus, the change in the emphasis and analysis of the facts
by the Supreme Court altered the perspective from a continuous pro-
cess to a static compartmentalization.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of two aspects of the court of
appeals' decision substantiated this hypothesis. First, the Court stated
that the "ultimate conclusion" of the court of appeals "seems to have
been that a prosecutor acts vindictively ... whenever his charging
decision is influenced by what he hopes to gain in the course of plea
bargaining negotiations." 52 This interpretation is inaccurate; a more
precise interpretation of the appellate court's decision would be that
there is evidence of vindictiveness when a prosecutor charges a de-
fendant with a more serious offense after an offer of leniency has been
rejected.5 3  The appellate court's decision did not turn on influences
regarding an advantageous position in plea negotiations, but on influ-
ences reflecting the prosecution's disappointment after the plea offer
was rejected. Second, the Supreme Court stated that the court of
appeals' holding was premised on the substance of the plea bargain
offer. Clearly, this interpretation is not warranted because the appel-
late court did not find that the substantive offer was a violation of due
process; the court held that the subsequent actions of the prosecutor
gave rise to the constitutional limitation.5 4  Thus, it was a procedural
violation on the part of the state, not directly related to the substance
of the offer, which led to the due process violation.
It is contended that the Supreme Court's misconstruction of the
facts and its misunderstanding of the appellate court's opinion created
an insurmountable problem for the Court, which could be alleviated
only by limiting the decision to the plea bargaining rationale. Having
52. 98 S. Ct. at 667.
53. The appellate court makes its ruling clear. See note 44 supra. In explanation of its ruling
the court states: "Accordingly, if after plea negotiations fail, he [the prosecutor] then procures
an indictment charging a more serious crime, a strong inference is created that the only reason
for the more serious charges is vindictiveness." 547 F.2d at 44-45.
54. The court of appeals' decision was limited since the court found nothing in the record
indicating that an' event occurred between the initial indictment and the subsequent indict-
ment that would have influenced the prosecutor's decision other than the defendant's insistence
on his right to a trial. Presumably the result would have been different if the prosecutor had
given some explanation for his conduct. Id. at 44.
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characterized the issue as limited to the plea negotiation sessions, 55
and given the dichotomy of the case law prior to Hayes, the Court
was faced with three logical alternatives. The first alternative was to
synthesize the case law and apply the vindictiveness standard to plea
bargaining. The second was to treat the two lines of cases as mutually
exclusive and declare the vindictiveness cases controlling. The third
alternative was to consider the plea bargaining and vindictiveness
cases separately, but to hold the plea bargaining cases determinitive.
Analysis of the first two alternatives will demonstrate that the Court's
acceptance of the third alternative was inevitable, given its initial
premises.
The first alternative, synthesis of the case law, would have required
a choice between holding plea bargaining unconstitutional or subject-
ing the substantive plea bargain to judicial scrutiny. If the vindictive-
ness standard was applied to plea bargaining, the Supreme Court
would be forced to face squarely the issue of punishment in that pro-
cess which has been strategically ignored in the past. 56 Since the
prosecutor's motive in offering the defendant a more lenient sen-
tence, and in threatening to reindict Hayes if he refused to accept the
offer, was to persuade the defendant to forego his right to trial, the
vindictiveness cases would hold this action unconstitutional. 57 This
result could be avoided only by restricting the ruling on the applica-
bility of the vindictiveness cases to specific situations where the de-
fendant alleges that he was punished 58 by the prosecutor or some
other state official for the assertion of his constitutional rights. How-
ever, this would require judicial review of plea bargaining on
55. The Supreme Court states that the situation is different from situations where the pros-
ecutor brings an additional charge, after a defendant has refused to plead guilty, without giving
notice to the defendant. The Court is not clear, but it would seem to substantiate the
hypothesis that the analysis is limited to the bargaining session itself, since that is how the
defendant, Hayes, got his "notice". See United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367 (9th
Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1970). The Su-
preme Court cites these cases but does not explicitly endorse them. See also United States v.
Andrews, 444 F. Supp. 1238 (E. 1). Mich. 1978), where the court distinguished Hayes by stating
that the decision was limited to the "dynamics" of plea bargaining. In that case, the defendants
were indicted for an additional conspiracy charge after they were successful in obtaining release
after being granted bail. The court's holding was based on the fact that the prosecutor's action
was not a legitimate part of our criminal justice system.
56. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
57. This would not necessarily be the result without the Supreme Court's faulty premises.
For factual situations where this would not result, see Simpson v. Rice, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)
(companion case to Pearce); United States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States ex rel. Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1970).
58. But see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S.
790 (1970), where the Court hints that there may be negative aspects to plea bargaining.
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a case by case basis, and one of the primary reasons for the accepta-
bility of plea bargaining as constitutional stemmed from the practical
realizations of judicial economy afforded by this process. Therefore,
the Court would be understandably reluctant to reaffirm the constitu-
tionality of plea bargaining by opening a "Pandora's box" of litigation
surrou-nding plea negotiations. The Supreme Court in Hayes fore-
closed this possibility by declaring that, as long as a defendant is
properly chargeable under a statute, the decision to prosecute or re-
duce the charge and the decision to offer a plea bargain is entirely
within the prosecutor's discretion. 59 While acknowledging that dis-
cretion may be abused, 60 the Hayes court held that the prosecutor
did not engage in unethical conduct in that instance. Thus, this first
option would have offered the Court the choice between two unde-
sireable results-the declaration of plea bargaining as unconstitutional
or the acceptance of a flood of litigation which the Court had indi-
cated it would not review.
The second alternative would treat the vindictiveness and plea bar-
gaining cases as mutually exclusive and declare the vindictiveness
cases to be controlling. Given the Supreme Court's factual perspec-
tive, this alternative was impractical since the plea bargaining cases
59. The American Bar Association has proposed standards relating to the prosecutor's use of
his discretion during plea bargaining. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY
§ 3.1. In pertinent part, the section provides as follows:
§ 3.1 Propriety of plea discussions and plea agreements.
(a) In cases in which it appears that the interest of the public in the effective
administration of criminal justice . . . would thereby be served, the prosecuting
attorney may engage in plea discussions for the purpose of reaching a plea agree-
ment. He should engage in plea discussions or reach a plea agreement with the
defendant only through defense counsel, except when the defendant is not eligible
for or does not desire appointment of counsel and has not retained counsel.
(b) The prosecuting attorney, in reaching a plea agreement, may agree to one or
more of the following, as dictated by the circumstances of the individual case:
(i) to make or not to oppose favorable recommendations as to the sentence
which should be imposed if the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere;
(ii) to seek or not to oppose dismissal of the offense charged if the defendant
enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to another offense reasonably re-
lated to the defendant's conduct; or
(iii) to seek or not to oppose dismissal of other charges or potential charges
against the defendant if the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo conten-
dere.
(c) Similarly situated defendants should be afforded equal plea agreement oppor-
tunities.
60. For a discussion of the prosecutor's use of discretion, see Abrams, Internal Policy:
Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1971); Comment,
Prosecutorial Discretion-A Re-Evaluation of the Prosecutor's Unbridled Discretion and Its
Potential for Abuse, 24 DE PAUL L. REV. 485 (1971).
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could not be distinguished in a context that is limited to plea bargain-
ing negotiations. 61 The court of appeals was able to avoid this situa-
tion by conceptualizing the facts as continuous and by holding the
prosecutor's subsequent action unconstitutional. This distinction of
plea bargaining was impossible under the Supreme Court's static in-
terpretation of the facts in Hayes.
Consequently, the Supreme Court's analysis centered on the third
alternative. The same factual characterization that prevented the
Court from distinguishing the plea bargaining cases from this context
allowed it to distinguish easily the vindictiveness cases in three
different areas. First, the Court stated that the vindictiveness cases
involved a unilateral imposition of a punishment by the state, but
argued that this element was not present in the "give and take" 62 of
plea negotiations. This analysis is clearly incorrect if the facts are con-
sidered as a continuum. Obviously, the prosecutor's subsequent
indictment was unilateral, but by confining the analysis to the plea
bargaining table, this action is classified as a result of a bilateral
agreement. Second, the Court agreed that to punish a person for his
assertion of constitution rights is "patently unconstitutional," 63 but it
stated that there is no such element of punishment in plea bargain-
ing. This analysis is inconsistent with the undisputed fact that the
prosecutor indicted Hayes because of the defendant's refusal to plead
guilty. 64 The third distinction was that, although the prosecutor's
action in Hayes may have a chilling effect on a defendant's assertion
of constitutional rights, this apprehension is "inherent" in the forced
choice situation of plea bargaining. The imposition of a difficult choice
in the assertion of one's constitutional rights is, according to the
Court, an "inevitable-and permissible-attribute of any legitimate
system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas." 65
61. This may be better understood by considering each step the prosecutor took in his
action with Hayes. At step 1, he indicted the defendant; at step 2 he made the plea offer with •
the concomitant threat to reindict; at step 3, he reindicted the defendant. The appellate court
focused on step 3 and held this action unconstitutional. The Supreme Court characterized the
situation as centered on step 2. Therefore, any discussion of the prosecutor's action is inherently
tied to the plea bargaining process.
62. 98 S. Ct. at 668.
63. Id. The only way to rationalize this statement is through the isolation of the prosecutor's
decision to reindict on the subsequent charge within the plea negotiation, and to admit the
prosecution's "interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forego his right to
plead not guilty." Id.
64. 98 S. Ct. at 667 n.7.
65. Id. at 668, citing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17,31 (1973). The Court's statement
does not address the argument that the plea bargaining process not only imposes this choice on
the defendant but also leaves him in a worse position if he refuses the offer than if he accepts it.
"Under America's regime of guilty plea bargaining, an offender who has exercised the right to
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The Court does not factually distinguish any of the vindictiveness
cases. The result of this analysis is that the Supreme Court has insu-
lated plea bargaining from the due process mandate against pro-
secutorial vindictiveness. 66 This is evident from the fact that the
vindictiveness cases are in no way disturbed, despite the Court's ap-
proval of the prosecutor's action in Hayes. On the contrary, their
basic legitimacy is affirmed even though the Court holds that they are
misapplied in the context of plea bargaining. 67
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
The Court could have chosen a middle ground which would have
resulted in a more workable and equitable solution to this conflict.
This alternative would have allowed the Court to acknowledge the
vindictive aspect of plea bargaining without declaring the process un-
constitutional. This option would utilize the rationale of United States
v. Jackson 68 and Brady v. United States,69 and would adequately
deal with the Supreme Court's dual concerns of upholding the con-
stitutionality of plea bargaining and limiting judicial review of sub-
stantive plea bargains.
In Jackson, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty pro-
vided in the Federal Kidnapping Act was an unconstitutional burden
on a defendant's assertion of his right to a jury trial. The statute pro-
vided that the death penalty could be given only upon jury recom-
mendation, and it contained no procedure for the death penalty for
those who waived their right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty. The
punishment scheme in the statute was held unconstitutional because
it made the risk of death the price of a jury trial, and it therefore
chilled the free exercise of a constitutional right. The Court held that,
if the only purpose or effect of the statute was to "chill the assertion
trial is likely to receive a much more severe sentence than an otherwise identical offender who
has pleaded guilty." Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Re-
cent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 553 (1978).
66. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
67. The Court's narrow ruling held "only that the course of conduct engaged in by the
prosecutor in this case" was constitutional. 98 S. Ct. at 669.
68. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). The defendant was charged under the federal kidnapping statute
that provided the death penalty if the jury recommended it. There was no provision for the
death penalty for those who waived their right to a jury trial or pleaded guilty. The defendant
asserted that the statutory scheme was an unconstitutional burden on his assertion of his con-
stitutional rights.
69. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The defendant was convicted under a kidnapping statute similar to
the one in Jackson. The Court. upheld his conviction because he pleaded guilty and limited its
examination to whether the plea was voluntary.
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of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise
them, [then] it would be patently unconstitutional." 70
In Brady, the Court upheld a similar statute against the defend-
ant's assertion that fear of the death penalty induced him to plead
guilty, which chilled his assertion of constitutional rights and there-
fore rendered his plea involuntary. 71  Brady's guilty plea was volun-
tary, the Court held, because it was only partially induced by fear of
the death penalty, and there were other factors that were more de-
terminative. Jackson did not render all pleas induced by fear of the
death penalty per se involuntary and therefore unconstitutional. Re-
quiring the defendant to make a difficult choice in deciding among
the assertion of various constitutional rights does not automatically
render the necessity of making a decision itself unconstitutional.
Since Brady's decision to plead guilty could have been attributed to
the fact that his co-defendant would testify at his- trial, the Court held
that the plea was entered voluntarily.
It has been argued that the true Jackson-Brady distinction turns on
strict necessity. 72 Jackson held that although Congress may have the
inherent power to impose the death penalty, it may not be imposed
"in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of constitutional
rights." 73 The question was not whether the effect was incidental or
intentional, but whether it was unnecessary and consequently exces-
sive. The Brady Court could not invalidate the defendant's plea of
guilty without "necessarily invalidat[ing] the widespread practice of
plea bargaining, which the Court thought essential to our system of
criminal justice." 74
If the Supreme Court in Hayes had utilized this rationale, the issue
of punishment could have been acknowledged forthrightly without in-
validating the plea bargaining process. 75 Acknowledgement that the
70. 390 U.S. 570, 581 (emphasis added).
71. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
72. Justice Marshall's dissent in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973) argued this
proposition. He stated that the jury's ability to impose a higher sentence upon retrial was an
unnecessary burden on the defendant's right to trial and that Jackson and Brady did not "in-
volve assessments of the relative severity of the burden on the right to choose to be tried by a
jury; they turned on the question of strict necessity." Id. at 45-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
also Note, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. REV. 63, 162 (1968), where the author
gives three eleme-ats that arguably distinguish the Jackson ruling from plea bargaining. One of
the elements is that Jackson's forced choice was needless but since plea bargaining "arguably
serves vital policy interests that are unattainable in any other way ... " it is a necessary burden
and therefore the Jackson rationale would be inapplicable. Id. at 162.
73. 390 U.S. 570, 583.
74. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 45 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75. Commentators openly suggest that there is a punitive aspect to plea bargaining. See,
e.g., Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HAirv. L. REV.
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chilling, penalizing effect of plea bargaining was necessary to the exis-
tence of the criminal justice system does not necessarily mean that it
"needlessly" penalizes the assertion of a defendant's right to plead not
guilty. 76 It must be admitted that plea bargains may benefit some
defendants substantially. Accordingly, the punishment involved may
be incidental and the restraint on the defendant's assertion of con-
stitutional rights would be necessary and therefore constitutional.
Even if it is conceded that plea bargaining may be a necessary
limitation on a defendant's rights, it does not follow logically that vin-
dictive state action is a necessary component of that system. The
Court could acknowledge that incidental burdens on the defendant
which may accrue under the plea bargaining system should not in-
clude subsequent vindictive action when the offer is rejected by the
accused. Apprehension is an inevitable component of any negotiation
process, but blatant vindictive action after the fact is not necessary.
Thus, the Court could have affirmed plea bargaining as a necessary
element of our criminal justice system, but also said that blatant pro-
secutorial vindictiveness is a needless burden on that system and is
therefore unconstitutional.
A second concern in this type of analysis would be the fear of a
flood of cases dealing with the substance of the bargain. However,
this decision would not rest on the substantive bargain, but on the
post-bargain process of reindictment. In keeping with the Jackson-
Brady rationale, the Court could hold plea bargaining constitutional
and merely state that the prosecutor's vindictive action was uncon-
stitutional. By limiting the decision in plea bargaining cases to actual
vindictiveness, the Court could avoid reviewing the prosecutor's bar-
gaining power and discretion. This would create no greater burden
than the Court already experiences in abuse of discretion charges. 77
564 (1978). The author candidly suggests that "[tihe right to reject the proposed plea bargain is
largely chimerical." Id. at 579. Similarly, in an article on the effects of fixed sentencing proce-
dures on the plea bargaining process, it has been stated that:
With the restriction of the parole board's discretion, a defendant who is considering
whether to accept a proposed plea agreement need not fear that the parole practices
may, to some extent, deprive him of the apparent benefit of his bargain; nor can a
defendant who chooses to stand trial hope that parole practices will ameliorate the
penalty that our system of justice threatens for his exercise of a constitutional right.
Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for
"Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550 (1978) (emphasis added).
76. See note 42 supra.
77. Lower courts have been able to deal adequately with judicial review of prosecutorial
vindictiveness without disturbing the substantive offer. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Musick, 425
F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1970), where the defendant was charged with drunk driving and the pro-
secutor offered to dismiss the charge if the defendant would stipulate that there was probable
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The counter-argument to this type of review is that it will have no
appreciable effect on the system, since an aggressive prosecutor
would merely indict all defendants under the most extensive charges
imaginable, Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion in Hayes, of-
fers a convincing answer to this objection. 78 He indicates that pro-
secutorial overcharging has never been openly sanctioned, but even if
it were, there are three reasons why the Court should not allow the
prosecutor to bring subsequent charges against a defendant after the
initial indictment. 79 First, if the prosecutor is forced to charge prior
to plea negotiations, he would be forced to make his charging deci-
sion based on the average case, which would at least limit the per-
sonal animosity that a prosecutor may feel toward a particular defen-
dant for asserting his constitutional right. Second, if the prosecutor
must initially charge the defendant with all applicable charges, or
waive the right to indict, the process will be kept in the public view.
This is certainly in keeping with the majority's fear of sending plea
bargaining "back into the shadows from which it has so recently
cause for his arrest. (The stipulation to a probable cause was apparently standard procedure in
that jurisdiction, since such a stipulation would preclude the defendant from suing the police
department for civil rights violations. There was ample evidence in the case that the police
department was "after" the defendant and that there was an absence of probable cause for the
arrest. Id.) While emphasizing that the prosecutor had authority to present the charge initially,
the court said that the prosecutor could not introduce a subsequent charge "because of failure to
obtain the demanded stipulation." Id. at 375. See also Dixon v. Columbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), where the defendant was stopped for a traffic violation. The prosecutor offered to
enter a nolle prosequi in return for the defendant's promise not to initiate civil proceedings
against the police department. When the defendant subsequently filed an action, the prosecutor
re-instituted the charge against him. The prosecutor indicated his rationale for bringing the
charges by stating: "I had no reason to file until he changed back on his understanding of what
we had all agreed on. This is done in many cases." Id. at 968. After indicating that this practice
was a "gross abuse of discretion," the court stated that there are limits to a prosecutor's use of
his discretionary power, and that he may not prosecute a case for the purpose of deterring an
individual's right to file a civil action. Id. Cf. United States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir.
1974), where the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of a three count indictment. A sentenc-
ing problem arose and the court allowed withdrawal of the plea. The defendant was reindicted
on the original three counts, and a fourth count arising from the same incident was added. The
court held the Pearce rationale applicable without addressing the question of plea bargaining,
holding that "the breakdown in the agreement seems scarcely a new reason for not including
the count initially." Id. at 1306. The case was reversed on other grounds. But cf. United States
v. Preciado-Gomez, 529 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1976) holding that a subsequent indictment arising
from different acts on different dates than the original indictment is not a constitutional violation
since there was no overt evidence of vindictiveness.
78. 98 S. Ct. at 670 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
79. See Note, Criminal Law - Prosecutors May Not Seek Habitual Offender Indictments
Against Defendants Unwilling to Plead Guilty to Lesser Charges Without Valid Justification, 7
MEM. ST. L. REV. 703 (1977) for a discussion of the appellate court's opinion in Hayes v.
Cowan, 547 F.2d 42 (6th Cir. 1976), in which the author indicates that a side effect of the
decision as analyzed by the court of appeals would be an increase in horizontal and vertical
overcharging. Id. at 710-11.
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emerged." 80 The third rationale is that a defendant has no way of
knowing that the prosecutor actually has the authority to do what he
threatens. Obviously, after the Supreme Court's decision in Hayes,
defendants may know that the prosecutor has the authority to re-
charge them under an enhanced statute. However, while acknowledg-
ing that the action engaged in by this prosecutor was acceptable, the
Court emphasized that the limits on prosecutorial discretion do exist.
Hence, defendants may not know whether another threat by a pros-
ecutor will be permissible, 81 so they may be more likely to "play it
safe" and accept the prosecutor's threat as valid. The effect would be
to keep the bargaining process in the "shadows" because the defend-
ants will be inclined to consent to the prosecutor's offer and avoid
the dilemma of Hayes. These situations dramatically point out the
need for the Supreme Court to separate the plea bargaining process
from overt vindictive state action.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's analysis in Hayes was based on a mis-
construction of the factual framework and an inaccurate interpretation
of the impact of the appellate court's decision. This misconception
altered the decision appreciably and forced the Court into the
anomalous situation of either accepting prosecutorial vindictiveness
subsequent to a plea negotiation failure or totally dismantling the plea
bargaining process. An alternative solution which would uphold the
constitutionality of plea bargaining but limit blatant prosecutorial vin-
dictiveness has been proposed. This alternative would have enabled
the Court to candidly admit that there are punitive aspects inherent
in plea bargaining, but hold that this chilling effect on a defendant's
assertion of his constitutional right is a necessary element of that system.
The alternative would have limited the chilling effect by declaring
that blatant prosecutorial vindictiveness was unnecessary and there-
fore unconstitutional. Thus, judicial review of prosecutorial action
would not, increase appreciably, since the Court presently reviews
abuse of discretion charges. Finally, even if the alternative approach
would tend to induce prosecutors to avoid the vindictiveness issue by
initially overcharging a defendant, there are sound policy reasons for
separating plea bargaining from other overt prosecutorial vindictive-
ness.
80. 98 S. Ct. at 669.
81. The majority seems to indicate that the defendant's knowledge of the prosecutor's in-
tended action was a significant factor in the Hayes decision. Id. at 666.
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Bordenkircher v. Hayes is a significant decision in the area of pre-
trial criminal procedure because it extends prosecutorial discretion
during plea negotiations into the realm of near non-reviewability.
This is startling when it is realized that plea negotiations were not
given constitutional sanction until 1971, and the acceptance of plea
bargaining, at least in part, was to prevent the process from being
"shrouded-in secrecy and deliberately concealed by participating de-
fendants, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and even judges." 82 In an
effort to preserve the constitutionality of plea bargaining, the Hayes
decision may have succeeded in again insulating the plea bargain
from judicial and public view.
Grace E. Wein
82. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977).
